INTRODUCTION
This article argues the study of traditions is an integral part of the human sciences and then concentrates on how to study them. First, we discuss of the idea of tradition. We do not do so in detail, preferring to use the notion to analyse three features of British government: public sector reform, Thatcherism and joined-up governance. (1) We use each of these illustrations to raise issues about the concept of tradition. We decenter the concept by moving from the general to the specific, from the institutional to the individual level, in our discussion. We start with a broad characterisation of the British governmental tradition. We describe it by comparing it to other governmental traditions. By so comparing traditions, we can identify and highlight some defining characteristics of the British governmental tradition treated as a whole. The next step is to unpack this broad idea of tradition into some of its constituents. We identify the Tory, Liberal, Whig and Socialist traditions, and show how each of them produces distinct analyses of Thatcherism. Finally, we unpack the Socialist tradition further still by comparing Old and New Labour's conception of governance. We progressively unpack the idea of tradition to show there is no one level of analysis suitable for answering all questions. Also, we discuss the issues raised by each illustration. These include reifying traditions, essentialism, identifying traditions, and the processes which create traditions.
ON TRADITION
Forms of explanation about human life commonly revolve around two sets of ideas.
The first set analyse the social context in which individuals reason and act in terms of such notions as tradition, institution, structure and paradigm. The second set analyse 4 the processes by which beliefs, practices, and institutions change in terms of the notions of reason and agency. Some philosophers believe the individual is autonomous -able to avoid the influence of tradition. Yet, once we reject a naive faith in pure experience, we must give up this idea of autonomy. We necessarily make sense of our experiences by drawing on prior theories. So, we cannot arrive at beliefs through experiences unless we already have a prior set of beliefs. Our experiences can lead us to beliefs only because we have already been socialised in the traditions of our community.
Other philosophers adopt a strong version of this conclusion, arguing that social structures, institutions, or paradigms limit or even fix not only our actions but also our beliefs and preferences. We have difficulty with this argument. Indeed, we would argue we must allow for agency because we cannot individuate beliefs and actions by reference to the social context alone. Different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the same social structure. There must be, therefore, an undecided space in front of these structures where individuals decide what beliefs
to hold and what actions to perform. So, we insist on the fact of agency. Doing so is not incompatible with our insistence on the unavoidable nature of tradition. On the contrary, we can combine a rejection of autonomy with a defence of agency by saying individuals always sets off against a social background that influences them but they then can reason and act in novel ways so as to alter this background. Here our use of tradition allows for individuals extending and modifying the traditions they inherit.
Just because individuals inherit tradition does not imply they cannot go on to change it. Rather, the ability to modify tradition is an integral feature of our responses to the world. We always confront slightly novel circumstances in which we need to apply 5 tradition anew, and no tradition can stipulate how it is applied (cf. Wittgenstein 1972 on using rules).
When unpacking the idea of tradition, we must not reify traditions. Tradition is a starting point, not something that fixes or limits later actions. Tradition is not an unavoidable influence on all we do, and to assume it is would be to leave too slight a role for agency. So, we think of tradition as an initial influence on people that colours their actions only if their agency has not led them to change it. Every strand of a tradition is in principle open to change. We should also be wary of essentialists who equate traditions with a fixed set or core of beliefs against which they then assess variations (see for example Greenleaf 1983) . No doubt there are circumstances when we can identify core ideas that persist through time. But, alternatively, we might identify a tradition with a group of ideas widely shared by several individuals although no one idea was held by them all. Or we might identify a tradition with a group of ideas passed from generation to generation, changing a little each time, so no single idea persists across all generations. Finally, we should be careful not to hypostatise traditions. We must not claim a Platonic existence for them independent of the beliefs and actions of individuals. Traditions are not fixed entities. They are not given, sat in a philological zoo, waiting for people to discover them. They are contingent, produced by the actions of individuals. The carriers of a tradition bring it to life. They settle its content and variations by developing their beliefs and practices, thereby adapting it to new circumstances while passing it on to the next generation. We can only identify the beliefs making up a tradition by looking at the shared understandings and historical connections that allow us to link its exponents with one another. In rejecting all reified and essentialist views of tradition, we are saying scholars can locate an individual in various traditions depending on what questions they seek to answer. Because there are no essentialist traditions, the scholar's task cannot be to place the individual in one of a finite set of fixed traditions. Rather, scholars identify the tradition against which someone believed or did something by tracing the relevant connections through time. The precise content they give to the tradition will depend on the particular beliefs or actions they hope to explain. If they want to explain someone's set of beliefs and actions, they will define the relevant tradition in one way.
If they want to explain only one belief or action, they may well define it differently. In this sense, scholars construct traditions for themselves. They pick out the beliefs and 7 actions of the individuals they are studying by using criteria of relevance drawn from their own interests. But this scholarly role is not a matter of concern. Any abstraction by any scholar depends on a principle of classification that gets its justification from the purposes underlying his or her research. Scholars may construct traditions but that does not mean traditions are unacceptably subjective. Whether an account of a tradition is judged objective depends on the adequacy of our understanding of the components and links by which we define that tradition. An account of a tradition must identify a set of connected beliefs and habits that intentionally or unintentionally passed from generation to generation at some time in the past.
The explanatory value of traditions lies in the way they show how individuals inherited beliefs and practices from their communities. Thus, the wider our definition of a tradition, the weaker its explanatory power. If we select monolithic epistemes, then we have to define them as the beliefs and actions shared by everyone in an epoch.
So when we try to explain the beliefs and actions of particular individuals, we will be able to explain only why they held these beliefs, not other, more specific beliefs. The narrower the definition of a tradition, the greater will be its explanatory power.
Scholars select traditions to explain specific features of human life. The value of the selected tradition stems from its explanatory power; from the scholars ability to provide evidence for the conceptual and historical links between the beliefs and actions which make up the tradition. The more exact the account of these links, the more fully we will be able to grasp the nature of the tradition, so the more explanatory work it will be able to do. Historical or temporal links show how the relevant beliefs and practices passed from one generation to another, explaining why the beliefs persisted through time. Conceptual links show us how the relevant beliefs and 8 practices form a coherent set, explaining why they persisted together as a loose knit whole rather than as isolated beliefs brought together by mere chance.
THREE ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we decenter the notion of tradition by showing it can be used at various levels of analysis and by exploring the problems which arise at each level. The first example compares the governmental traditions of Britain and Denmark. By so doing, we can identify and highlight the defining characteristics of the British governmental tradition broadly understood, but at a price. The key problems are reification and the loss of explanatory power when traditions are defined so broadly.
Comparing Britain and Denmark
A governmental tradition is a set of inherited beliefs about the institutions and history of government. Loughlin and Peters (1997: 46) British ministers are powerful. As in Denmark, they are individually accountable to parliament. But they are always subject to party discipline and collective cabinet accountability. Public sector reform was not at the discretion of individual ministers.
It was an programmatic, party driven, co-ordinated change. There is no equivalent to the Danish tradition of independent ministers. The Danish system of ministerial government means effective public sector reform depends on political co-operation between ministers. Each minister can decide on the preferred reforms for her or his ministry. There is no overall control of the reform process. No political-bureaucratic system can work without trust and pragmatism which are the essential currency of coordination in Denmark.
Generalists vs. professional autonomy.
Generalist civil servants in Britain are political-administrators. They fire-fight for ministers to keep them out of trouble in parliament and elsewhere. They draw together and interpret specialist advice for ministers who are rarely experts in their field of responsibility. By tradition they are a source of 'institutional scepticism' about policies but, once the decision is made, their job is to give ministers what they want; nowadays they are described as 'can do' civil servants. So, they delivered public sector reform.
There are no generalist civil servants in Denmark. All are specialists, whether lawyers or the professional experts of the welfare state, and they play a key role in policy formulation and design as well as implementation, providing 'integrated advice'
(Ministry of Finance 1998). So, public sector reform in Denmark displays a 'pragmatic tool orientation' (Greve and Jespersen 1998: 14) , a 'technocratic-rational' conception of the reforms (Jensen 1998: 60) 
Freedom to manage vs. political control.
Parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial accountability mean both governments face a similar problem of bureaucratic accountability. Politicians and top bureaucrats in both countries distinguish between policy and management, justifying the reforms with the argument that it gives managers the freedom to manage and deliver public services efficiently. Ostensibly, there is an obvious contrast between British agencification and Danish de-agencification. So, British reforms sought to increase the freedom to manage whereas Danish reforms sought to increase political control, a course of action which undermines the rationale of the reforms. Any such conclusion is misleading. Agency reform in both countries seeks to increase political control of the bureaucracy. NPM is sometimes said to take apart hierarchy. But several strands clearly aim to reinforce hierarchical control. De-agencification is one example; it is an attempt to make hierarchy work And Britain faces the same tension between deconcentration and political control. The ( 
Consumer vs. citizen.
Danish reforms to strengthen user and citizen roles in public sector service delivery are distinctive. The description 'self-organising' is apt and the consumer reforms in Britain are no parallel. Such reforms are distinctively Scandinavian and there is no reason to associate them with the NPM which never envisaged democratisation as a means of delivering services let alone improving efficiency. We almost might say that while other reforms were 'interpreted' through the lens of Danish political traditions, the citizen reforms are a product of that tradition.
14 So, there are differences in the aims, measures and outcomes of public sector reforms in Britain and Denmark; differences which we explain by the differences in the governmental traditions of the two countries. But this analysis has its problems.
The comparison of public sector reform in Britain and Denmark poses questions about the danger of reifying traditions or defining them in an essentialist way. For example, Greenleaf (1983:15-20) describes the British political tradition as a dialectic between two opposing tendencies: libertarianism and collectivism (but cf. Beer 1965).
Libertarianism stresses four things: the basic importance of the individual; the limited role of government; the dangers of concentrating power; and the rule of law. Its opposite, collectivism, stresses: the public good; social justice; and the idea of positive government. These strains exist in both political parties. They set the boundaries to political debate. Our view of tradition differs. His opposing tendencies are ahistorical. Although they come into being in the nineteenth century, they remain static, acting as fixed categories, ideal types, into which he forces individual thinkers and texts, even different parts of the one text or different utterances by the one thinker.
Tradition is a starting point, not a destination, and instances cannot be constructed by comparison with the features of a tradition. Traditions do not constitute the beliefs that people come to hold or the actions they perform.
Also the explanatory value of traditions lies in how they account for the processes by which people pick up beliefs and practices. The broader our definition of a tradition, the less it can explain. So, for any country, we need to move beyond broad comparisons to explore the multiple traditions and who voices which tradition. Thus, (Jensen 1998: 65) . There is the 'slow revolution' narrative which sees change continuously translated through the beliefs and actions of actors socialised into the traditions of Danish government (Olsen 1983) . There is the democratic revolution narrative built around the active citizen. An understanding of change starts with conflicting beliefs. The beliefs about the freedom to manage in the public sector reforms simply point up these conflicts because they bump into beliefs about professional autonomy and ministerial accountability. Individuals set out from within a tradition but they can extend, vary and at times reject that tradition. The different stories, the colliding ideas and the dilemmas posed by conflicting ideas become the wellspring for yet more change.
In short, the idea of tradition can be defined so broadly, can become so abstract, that it becomes indistinguishable from the idea of an institution. There is a potential conflict between an idea of tradition which permits cross-national comparison and one which allows us to unpack institutions and explore the beliefs and practices that construct them.
Varieties of 'Thatcherism'.
If this broad notion of tradition has limited explanatory value, we need to unpackdecenter -it and identify some of the constituent traditions. In this example, we identify the Tory, Liberal, Whig and Socialist traditions, and show how each tradition 16 produces distinct analyses of Thatcherism. Figure 2 sketches the four traditions and their account of Thatcherism. We provide a brief summary of each tradition and an example of one its narratives of 'Thatcherism'. We then explore the associated problems of essentialism and identifying traditions.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

The Tory Tradition
The Tory tradition is elusive and all too often defined more by what it isn't. Gilmour and 1992: 272-3) adopts Oakeshott's distinction between the state as a civil and an enterprise association. An enterprise association is 'human beings joined in pursuing some common substantive interest, in seeking the satisfaction of some common want or in promoting some common substantive interest'. Persons in a civil association 'are not joined in any undertaking to promote a common interest … but in recognition of non-instrumental rules indifferent to any interest'; that is, a set of common rules and a common government in pursuing their diverse purposes (Gilmour 1978: 98) . So a free society has 'no preconceived purpose, but finds its guide in a principle of continuity … and in a principle of consensus' (Gilmour 1978: 97) . The Tory tradition favours civil association and only accepts the state as an enterprise association 'when 17 individuals are able to contract out of it when it suits them' (Gilmour 1992: 272) .
Nonetheless Gilmour (1978: 236) accepts that some state intervention will often be convenient, practical politics, essential to preserving the legitimacy of the state.
One Nation Toryism is one narrative of 'Thatcherism' in the Tory tradition. It sees Thatcherism as a threat to both the Conservative Party and to national unity. Gilmour holds that if the state is not interested in its people, they have no reason to be interested in the state (Gilmour 1978: 118) . So, the government should ''conserve' the fabric of society and avoid the shocks of violent upheavals' and 'look to the contentment of all our fellow countrymen' (Gilmour 1992: 278) .
The Liberal Tradition
The narrative of 'Thatcherism' as the revival of nineteenth century liberalism, with its faith in free markets, determined to slay the dragon of collectivism, and reverse 
So the narrative in the Liberal tradition stresses markets and its storyline is to reverse
Britain's economic decline through free markets sustained by an enterprise culture.
The Whig Tradition
The Whig tradition typically uses the Westminster model (for a guide and references see Bevir and Rhodes 1999; Tivey 1988) . This model has many variants but the family of concepts includes Britain as a unitary state characterised by: parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability through elections; majority party control of the executive (that is, prime minister, cabinet and the civil service); elaborate conventions for the conduct of parliamentary business; institutionalised opposition, and the rules of debate (Gamble 1990: 407) . The Whig tradition also incorporates an idealist strand, seeing 'institutions as the expression of human purpose' and focusing, therefore, on the interaction between ideas and institutions (see Rhodes 1997a: chapter 4; Gamble 1990: 409; Johnson 1975: 276-7) . It highlights 'how institutions and ideas react and co-operate with one another' (Greenleaf (1983: xi); gradualism; and the capacity of British institutions to evolve and cope with crisis.
Indeed, Whig historiography comes perilously close to telling the story of a single, unilinear, progressive idea, reason or spirit underlying the evolution of the British 20 political system. Institutions provide the 'capacity for independent action, leadership and decision' while remaining 'flexible and responsive'. As important, the political science profession esteemed this tradition; they 'were largely sympathetic' (Gamble 1990: 411) ; 'convinced that change needed to be evolutionary'; and celebrated 'the practical wisdom embodied in England's constitutional arrangements' (Gamble 1990: 409 and for recent examples see : Hennessy 1995; Norton 1996) . In this tradition, power is an object which belongs to the prime minister, cabinet or civil service. So, 'power relationships are a zero-sum game where there is a winner and a loser' and power is 'ascribed to an institution or person and fixed to that person regardless of the issue or the context' (Smith 1998) . Personality is a key part of any explanation of an actor's power. The Whig tradition's narrative of 'Thatcherism' contains these characteristics. Kavanagh (1990) uses the theme of 'the end of consensus', and an analysis of the interplay between events, ideas and actors, to argue the political agenda of British government has been substantially rewritten. Consensus refers to agreement between political parties and governing elites about the substance of public policy; the rules of the political game; and the political style for resolving policy differences (Kavanagh 1990: 6) . Thatcher had a distinctive set of New Right inspired policies: using monetary policy to contain inflation; reducing the public sector; freeing the labour market through trade union reform; and restoring the government's authority. These policies would free markets and create the enterprise society. He concludes the government was 'radical and successful' (ibid.: 241); 'reversed the direction of previous post-war administrations' (ibid.: 209); and that its policies, which appeared far-fetched in 1978, such as privatisation, are no longer exceptional (ibid.: 281). In typical balanced, not to say Whig style, Kavanagh opines 'talk of permanent or irreversible changes may be too bold' but 'the Thatcher government has created a new agenda, one which a successor government will find difficult to reverse' (ibid.: 302).
This narrative accommodates 'Thatcherism' to the Whig tradition in two ways. First, it identifies the constraints on political action and the continuities in policy to domesticate the political convulsions of the 1980s. Thus, Kavanagh (1990: 18, 238-41 and 15) treats 'events' as a constraint on political leadership; recognises the changes had many causes; and muses how 'disappointment has been a fact of life for British … governments'. Nonetheless there has been change and Thatcher is central to his explanation. So, second, this Whig narrative explains change by appeal to the personal power of Thatcher. Kavanagh repeatedly describes her as the 'dominant figure'; and 'a remarkable figure ' (ibid.: 243; 272; 276; 318) . Of course, 'we are not claiming that personal leadership is all-important but Mrs Thatcher's personality and policies enabled her to take advantage of the constellation of events and ideas'. Nonetheless, the storyline of this narrative assigns great explanatory power to Thatcher's personal qualities and her distinctive policies. Above all, it is part of the Whig tradition. Kavanagh (1990: 209) makes the point succinctly: 'Over the long term, continuity is more apparent than discontinuity'.
The Socialist Tradition
The Socialist tradition, with its structural explanations focused on economic factors and class and its critique of capitalism tells a historical story which is anti-Whig. For example, Marquand (1988: 198) comments: 'The old Whig historians were not wrong in thinking that Britain's peaceful passage to democracy owed much to the hazy 22 compromises'. However, 'once these compromises cease to be taken for granted', then 'respect for the rules of the game will ebb away'. So, the Whig tradition collapses because it confronts a heterogeneous, pluralistic society in which authority has been de-mystified, cultural values have changed, the political system has lost legitimacy, and territorial politics is in disarray (ibid.: 199-204) . Although the Socialist narratives of 'Thatcherism' come in many guises, we provide one brief illustration.
Marquand (1988) In short, the socialist narratives interpret the 'end of consensus' as part of the crisis of British capitalism stemming from its inability to become a developmental state.
'Thatcherism' is a local response to this crisis and is beset by internal contradictions. There is no single notion to be explained. It was not an objective, given social phenomenon with a single clear identity, but rather several overlapping but different entities constructed within overlapping but different traditions.
Because an individual can be placed in many traditions depending on the purposes of the study, the content of any tradition will vary with what we want to explain. We will identify traditions according to our own purposes, selecting one from the many because it best explains the actions and beliefs of the individual we are studying. The choice of tradition depends on what we are trying to explain. We can pick from a plurality of traditions at many levels of generality. The task confronting the scholar is to find the sources of evidence which show that each historical story has a coherent set of ideas and to trace the relevant connections between the ideas through time. So, this analysis of Thatcherism shows how several traditions adapted to its ideas and argues scholars construct traditions to answer the questions which interest them and we judge 25 the usefulness of such a construction by the evidence marshalled to show the links between the ideas over time and the ability to explain how beliefs change.
New Labour and Joined-up governance A notion like the socialist tradition can be too static to explore how specific ideas changed through time. If we want to describe the beliefs of New Labour and explain how they differ from Old Labour, we will have to explore how the Socialist tradition has been adapted.
New Labour has invoked a succession of visions, from the stakeholder society to 'the third way', all of which mark its distinctive response to dilemmas such as stateoverload. Blair (1998) For example, David Clark (1997) , then the Minister for Public Services, explained that policies such as market testing 'will not be pursued blindly as an article of faith'
but they 'will continue where they offer best value for money'. New Labour insists that markets are not always the best way to deliver public services. They can go against the public interest, reinforce inequalities, and entrench privilege. Besides, much of the public sector simply is not amenable to market competition. Indeed trust and partnership are essential. With no market, one has to rely on either honest cooperation or specify standards in absurd detail. Far from promoting efficiency, therefore, marketization can undermine standards of service quality (Rhodes 1997b ).
On the other hand, New Labour does not defend the command bureaucracy associated with Old Labour. Rather, we can identify a shift in the social democratic tradition inspired in part by the New Right's concerns with market efficiency and choice. For example, Mandelson and Liddle (1996: 27) explicitly reject the 'municipal socialism'
and 'centralised nationalisation' of the past. They insist New Labour 'does not seek to provide centralised 'statist' solutions to every social and economic problem.' Instead New Labour promotes the idea of networks of institutions and individuals acting in partnership held together by relations of trust. New Labour's concern with networks based on relations of trust does not exclude either command bureaucracy or quasimarket competition. Rather, New Labour proposes a mix of hierarchies, markets, and networks, with choices depending on the service under consideration. So, government policy is that 'services should be provided through the sector best placed to provide 28 those services most effectively', where 'this can be the public, private or voluntary sector, or partnerships between these sectors' (Cm 4011 1998). Even a simple service is liable to display a mix of structures, strategies, and relationships.
The Labour government uses networks to institutionalise its ideals of partnership and an enabling state. Blair (1998) stated the aims succinctly: 'joined-up problems need joined-up solutions' and this theme runs through the Modernising Government White
Paper with its frequent references to 'joined-up' government and 'holistic governance' (Cm 4130 1999: 6, 7, 10-11, 15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 27, 32, 33, 40, 45, 46 
32
Our approach is distinct because we answer our question by constructing narratives. In effect, we argue for political ethnography: studying individual behaviour in everyday contexts; gathering data from many sources; adopting an 'unstructured' approach (that is, 'data is collected in a raw form' not to a preconceived plan); focusing on one group or locale; and, in analysing the data, stressing the 'interpretation of the meanings and functions of human action' (paraphrased from Hammersley 1990: 1-2; see also Geertz, 1973: 20-21) .
The reference to 'everyday contexts' does imply micro-analysis but it does not necessarily imply a bottom-up approach. The analysis is not restricted to any one category of actor. Thus, we can explore the rules of statecraft, or operating code, of central political elites. The key aims of statecraft are to achieve governing competence and to preserve the centre's autonomy in 'High Politics' (for example, foreign, defence and trade policy, although increasingly the term also covers macro-economic policy). The approach invites the historical analysis of the beliefs and actions of elite actors. Equally, we know street-level bureaucrats can make and remake policy. We 
